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Recent research suggests that income redistribution preferences vary across identity groups. 
We employ statistical learning methods which emphasize pattern recognition, classification 
and regression trees (CART
TM) and random forests (RandomForests
TM), to uncover what 
these groups are. Using data from the General Social Survey, we find that, out of a large set 
of identity markers, only race, gender, age, and socioeconomic class are important classifiers 
for income redistribution preferences. Further, the uncovered identity groupings are 
characterized by complex patterns of interaction amongst these salient classifiers. We 
explore the extent to which existing theories of income redistribution can explain our results, 
but conclude that current approaches do not fully explain the findings. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
What determines an individual's preferred level of income redistribution? We present 
new evidence from the General Social Survey (GSS) that views on whether there should be 
governmental administration of income redistribution are found to differ along racial, 
gender, and class lines in the United States. That is, identity groups are found to be salient in 
describing individual views regarding government's role in the reduction of income 
inequality. 
In particular, there is a widely-held belief that individuals who are similar tend to 
have homogenous views on income redistribution. What do we mean when we say that two 
individuals are similar? The existing empirical literature emphasizes race and gender as 
important factors in predicting preference for income redistribution
1. However, to our 
knowledge, all previous investigations of heterogeneity in redistribution preferences have 
been carried out using pre-specified identity groups. Doing so potentially leads to 
misspecification of factors that characterize heterogeneity and results in incorrect inference
2. 
We take a more general approach. We consider a wide range of identity markers, 
including race and gender, and let the data decide which dimensions are important. To do 
this, we employ statistical learning methodologies that emphasize pattern recognition, 
classification and regression trees (CART
TM) and random forests (RandomForests
TM), in 
order to better uncover the role of identity in driving differences in redistribution 
                                                 
1 Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) and Luttmer (2001) examine the role of race, while Edlund and Pande 
(2002) examine the role of gender. Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) include race and gender in 
their empirical studies, but do not focus on these variables. 
 
2 Manski (1993) examines the consequences for estimation of allowing returns to education to vary across 
identity groups. When identity groups are fixed beforehand by the econometrician, Manski shows that there are 
serious estimation consequences for defining those groups differently than do individuals. See also Brock and 




preferences. That is, we investigate which aspects of identity are apposite for describing 
patterns of income redistribution preferences.  
Existing theoretical treatments of how income redistribution preferences are 
determined imply varying roles for identity. These theories fall into two classes. In the first, 
individual views on redistribution are preference-based. That is, identity matters because people 
care, in an exogenous fashion, about the actions or outcomes of others in the same or across 
identity groups. The relevance of identity to economic decision-making is modeled via 
modifications to the preference structure. 
In the second, identity provides information about an individual's economic 
circumstances in an environment with uncertainty. The outcomes of others in an agent's 
identity group may be used to make predictions about her unknown quantity of interest. In 
information-based theories, identity matters in one of two ways. The actions and outcomes of 
others can be informational inputs into each individual's decision-making, and identity 
provides a guide to what information is most salient for this process. Alternatively, identity 
groupings can correspond to a set of initial conditions that have persistent implications for 
redistribution preferences. In contrast to preference-based approaches, the preference 
structures of agents per se are taken to be mutually independent. 
These theories imply restrictions on identity's role in determining heterogeneity 
across a set of subjective and objective outcomes that are related to income redistribution 
preferences. We evaluate these restrictions using appropriate questions in the GSS dataset. 
Our exploration of these empirical restrictions leads us to conclude that existing theories are 




In Section 2, we discuss existing theories of income redistribution preference 
determination and their empirical implications. In Section 3, the empirical methodologies, 
classification and regression trees and random forests, are described and the reasons for their 
use are explained. In Section 4, we briefly describe the data and estimation details. In Section 
5, we present and interpret our results in the context of the theoretical literature. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Theories on Income Redistribution Preferences 
 
2.1  Preference-based Theories 
 
The defining feature of preference-based theories is their reliance on an exogenously-
specified interdependence of preferences that potentially corresponds to identity groups. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) provide a seminal contribution to the literature on identity by 
specifying a channel through which identity affects economic decision-making. In their 
model, an individual's utility depends upon others' actions as well as one's own. Crucially, 
utility also is dependent on a vector of parameters that describes an individual's identity and 
her conformity to a set of identity-specific norms. Their paper provides a general 
specification allowing for interdependence of preferences across pre-specified identity 
groups. 
An important example of this type of model is that of Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 
(1999). They interpret their model as one in which an individual's utility from a public good 




case is specified as variation in the preference for a public good. Relatedly, Alesina, Glaeser 
and Sacerdote (2001) posit that individual utility is dependent on the utilities of members of 
other ethnic groups. They conclude that this awareness of ethnic heterogeneity, or “racism”, 
could be responsible for the divergence in views on redistribution across groups. 
Because these models do not elicit, but rather assume, which identity groups matter, 
we know of no direct way of testing whether interdependent preferences truly drive 
empirical observations. These studies tend to focus on ethnicity as the important identity 
marker. It is of interest, however, to ascertain whether there are other prominent dimensions 
of identity which matter to redistribution preferences. This is what we seek to uncover in 
this paper. 
 
2.2  Information-based Theories 
 
We consider two classes of information-based theories. In one set of theories, 
identity corresponds to a set of initial conditions for the individual, and these have persistent 
effects. In this way, outcomes across individuals can be classified according to these initial 
conditions. Benabou (1996) surveys the literature on inequality and its immediate 
implications for, among other things, redistribution preferences. The basic idea is to link 
income heterogeneity with variation in private tolerance for inequality, and in turn with 
differences in the preference for income redistribution. 
An interesting extension of this mechanism is proposed by Benabou and Ok (2001). 
They formalize a “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) hypothesis in order to understand 




redistribution. They show that with a single, commonly-known, concave function that links 
current to future individual income, a group of voters with incomes less than the mean but 
above some threshold will vote against redistribution. They do so because the concavity of 
the mobility process leads them to expect a higher than average income in the next period. 
This model predicts that patterns of heterogeneity in income, tolerance for 
inequality, and preference for income redistribution should be related, with a one-to-one 
correspondence between the latter two. In this framework there is no distinction between 
one's values concerning income inequality and one's voting decision on a specific 
redistribution policy.  
From this framework we expect to find that any classification of responses to 
redistribution preferences according to identity matches those for tolerance of inequality. 
The model also implies these two patterns of classification are nested in, and thus no larger 
than, the complexity of classification patterns with regard to income. 
In a second set of theories, identity is viewed as a source of information about one's 
outcomes in an environment with uncertainty. Loury (1998), for instance, argues that people 
are ‘socially located’ - they are part of social and cultural networks that exert strong influence 
on behavior. Behavior may be ex-post rational in that it is self-fulfilling and persistent. As a 
result, initial differences across groups can have long run effects on outcomes such as 
income or preferences for income redistribution. 
As an example of such information-based models, Piketty (1995) presents a model in 
which there is a single mobility process that is unknown to agents. Also, agents exhibit a 
common social welfare function representing a shared tolerance for income differences. 




In this framework, mobility beliefs directly inform preferences for income redistribution. 
Further, mobility beliefs are parameterized to correspond to views on the relative 
importance of luck and hard work in determining one's future income. 
According to this model, long-run differences in preference for redistribution and 
mobility beliefs are a result of two forces. Initial differences in the priors over the true 
mobility process are one factor. A second is that individual learning about the mobility 
process uses incomplete information that varies across individuals. Specifically, individuals 
use information only from their own past experience and the population's average 
experience, and individuals do not experiment in order to learn. 
Piketty provides a framework in which a single true mobility process and a common 
abstract tolerance for inequality can co-exist with heterogeneous mobility beliefs that drive 
variation in preferences for income redistribution. A role for identity, akin to that suggested 
by Loury, is introduced into this framework by allowing individuals to extend their learning 
to a reference group that is defined by identity. In this setting, heterogeneity in mobility 
beliefs and income redistribution preferences across individuals will both correspond to 
these reference groups
3. 
Both types of information-based models suggest that we should observe identity 
groupings for current income that are at least as complex as that for redistribution 
preferences. For instance, in Piketty's framework, mobility beliefs within reference groups 
can converge over time, although they may differ across groups. Income heterogeneity will 
not disappear because it is determined in part by a stochastic process that is exogenous to 
beliefs. 
                                                 
3 For long run heterogeneity in mobility beliefs, we require that these reference groups vary in their priors 
regarding a true mobility process and that there is heterogeneity in the income distribution history across 




We use the predictions of the Benabou and Ok and Piketty models to structure our 
empirical study and we evaluate the consistency of those predictions with the data. The 
predictions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
2.3  Framework    
 
Formally, let  yY ∈  denote an outcome variable of interest that takes on K  
categorical values {} K y y ,..., 1  and let  x X ∈  be a vector of M  identity markers (which 
might be discrete or continuous variables or a mixture of both). We model the population of 
individuals as being classified by their identity markers into an unknown number b  of 
subpopulations indexed by  j . Within each subpopulation  j , individuals are expected to 
return a response of 
*
j y  for the outcome variable of interest. The classification of individuals 
into identity subgroups corresponds to the partitioning of the support of identity markers, 




= Λ= . The partitions  j A are mutually exclusive and their union 







= U .  
For example, suppose y measures redistribution preferences, and  () Sex Race x , =  
where  Race takes on values {} W B,  and Sex  takes on values { } F M, . Then, a possible set 
of identity partitions,  { } 123 ,, A AA Λ= , is  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } WF WM BM BF , , ,  with corresponding 
expected responses { }
* * * , , WF WM B y y y . That is, in this example, if this were the set of identity 
groupings that we uncovered in the data, we would conclude that redistribution preferences 




are black, white-male, or white-female. Our interest is in uncovering the identity partitions 
that characterize the data, as well as to estimate the predicted assignments of categorical 
outcome responses to each identity subgroup.. 
Suppose there are two outcomes of interest,  1 y  and  2 y , where  2 y  measures the 
preference for redistribution of income. A theory of redistribution preference may imply a 
mapping f of a partition  1 Λ  that corresponds to  1 y  into a partition  2 Λ  that corresponds 
to 2 y . Under Piketty's theory, f implies that  12 Λ =Λ  where  1 y  represents mobility beliefs. 
Specifically, heterogeneity in income redistribution preferences co-exists with analogous 
heterogeneity in mobility beliefs and homogenous tolerance of inequality. Under the 
framework of Benabou and Ok, f implies  12 Λ =Λ  where  1 y  represents private tolerance for 
inequality. That is, heterogeneity in income redistribution preferences is present alongside 
analogous heterogeneity in tolerance of inequality and homogenous mobility beliefs.  
In both settings, a partition  1 Λ  that corresponds to current income as  1 y  should 
have at least as many elements as  2 Λ . Specifically, the elements of  2 Λ  should be a subset of 
the elements of  1 Λ . We proceed to investigate these implications. 
 
3.  Empirical Methodology 
 
The main tool we use in the empirical analysis is classification and regression trees 
(CART
TM). We provide a briefly description of the CART




refer the reader to Breiman, Friedman, Olsen, and Stone (1984)
4 for further details on 
classification and regression tree methods.   
CART
TM delivers a set of identity partitions by carrying out essentially two 
algorithms: (1) recursive binary splitting of the set of all observations, and (2) cost complexity 
pruning to address over-fitting. The recursive binary splitting algorithm starts with the set of 
all observations. It then classifies the observations into two subsequent sub-samples by 
exhaustively searching
5 across the support points of all split variables (i.e., identity markers in 
our case) so as to find a split point that minimizes the joint node impurity across the two 
sub-samples. That is, the algorithm attempts to locate the split variable (i.e., identity marker) 
and associated split value (i.e., value for that identity marker) that produces the largest 
decrease in diversity in the outcome responses within each sub-sample.  
Formally, for any partitioning,  m A , of the observations based on identity makers, let 
the proportion of  k y  responses be given by  () ∑
∈
= =
m i A x
k i
m
mk y y I
N
p
1 ˆ . Let  m Q  be a 
measure of misclassification of responses (i.e., impurity) within this partition. For instance, 









. The Gini index can be 
interpreted by noting that if we relabeled the responses as 1 for observations that yielded   k y  
and 0 otherwise, the variance in the partition  m A  of this binary response is given by   
() mk mk p p ˆ 1 ˆ − . Summing across all possible responses gives us the Gini index. That is, the 
                                                 
4 We use the CART ™ software available from Salford Systems (http://www.salfordsystems.com).  
 
5 Loh and Shih (1997) point out that there may be variable selection bias towards identity markers which take 
on more values in CARTTM’s exhaustive search algorithm. To get around this problem, we impose a penalty on 
high categorical variables in CARTTM. We calibrate the penalty to ensure that categorical variables have no 





Gini index is a variance estimate based on comparisons of all possible responses in a 
subgroup. An alternative impurity measure, the Twoing index (see Breiman et. al. (1984)) 
treats the k  responses problem as if it were a binary response problem. It has been found 
that Twoing tends to give considerably better prediction performance than Gini when the 
dependent variable is a higher-level categorical variable (i.e., with 10 or more categories). We 
therefore emphasize results which employ the Twoing index as the impurity measure in 
Section 4, but note that we find no substantive differences using the Gini index (unreported 
results).  
CART
TM takes the set of all observations and partitions them into two sub-samples – 
the Left and Right nodes – by choosing an identity marker,  j , and a corresponding value, s, 
in the support of  j  so as to minimize the joint impurity across the two sub-samples; i.e., 
() () () s j Q s j Q R L s j , , min
, + . This process is then repeated iteratively on each of the subsequent 
sub-samples, and so on, until the number of observations in each sub-sample is too small for 
further splitting to occur.  
The result of the recursive binary splitting algorithm is a full set of partitions of the 
original sample or “tree”. In order to avoid over-fitting, this tree is then “pruned”. 
Essentially, the pruning algorithm locates the (nested) subset of partitions within the full set 
of partitions that minimizes a generalized information criterion where the complexity penalty 
parameter is chosen by V-fold cross-validation
6. The final set of partitions (the “pruned” 
tree) is then reported by CART
TM. To be clear, the end result of CART
TM is to deliver a set of 
homogeneous groupings of outcome responses and a pattern of identity partitions that 
characterizes these groupings, subject to not over-fitting the data. 
                                                 






TM has been shown to be consistent in the sense that as the number of 
observations gets large, the algorithm reproduce the “true” set of sample splits (see Breiman 
et. al. (1984)). Their weakness, however, lies in the lack of available asymptotic results that 
would be useful for conducting inference on split variable choices and split value estimates
7. 
Our method, therefore, does not allow for a straightforward hypothesis test of, for instance, 
the Benabou and Ok or Piketty predictions with the classification patterns uncovered in the 
data.  We therefore do the next best thing and attempt to assess the validity of our CART
TM 
tree results in terms of prediction performance. Specifically, we compare them with those 
obtained using Breiman’s (2001) RandomForests
TM (RF) algorithm.  
RF is an adaptive classification method which combines bootstrap aggregation 
(“bagging”) with pooling information from a multiplicity or ensemble of randomly built trees 
to obtain classifications of the outcome responses with lower mean prediction error 
compared to CART
TM. In fact, Breiman (2001) has shown that the prediction performance of 
RF is currently unmatched beating other leading adaptive learning methods like boosting. 
However, because RF pools information from a multiplicity of (randomly generated) trees, 
the results lack the sort of structural interpretability that CART
TM is able to offer in the form 
of a tree diagram. Because the uncovering of such structure is a main goal of this paper, we 
limit RF’s role to two aspects. RF does offer guidance on which identity markers are salient 
in the classification of outcome responses into groups; we wish to compare the identity 
markers found to be important by RF with those in our CART
TM tree results. Also, we want 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that there have been recent advances on this front in the context of test-based sequential 
sample splitting and threshold regression (as opposed to classification) models (see Hansen (1999, 2000)). 
However, results such as confidence intervals derived in these settings are restricted to the single split variable-
single split case. There is, however, some comfort from the fact that studies comparing classifications obtained 
by CARTTM with those gathered using sample splitting methods tend to be identical (see, in particular, Duffy 





to see how much better RF does in terms of reducing mean prediction error when compared 
to CART
TM in order to assess the validity of the latter’s results.  
We now briefly describe the RF algorithm and state key results. We refer the reader 
to Breiman (2001)
8 for further details on random forests methods and implementation. RF 
generates a multiplicity of trees, and then pools information from these trees to obtain the 
best classification of responses in the following way. First, RF obtains L bootstrap samples 
(with replacement) from the data. Then, for each bootstrap sample, one third is left aside 
(“out-of-bag”) while two thirds are used to generate a tree (fully grown without pruning) 
using CART
TM. To generate each tree, RF randomly selects a subset of identity markers of 
fixed size  M m <  from the set of all identity markers to be used as split variables. Therefore, 
as a result, an outcome response assignment is obtained for each observation in about one-
third of the trees.  
Each tree now “votes” for the final outcome assignment for each observation. That 
is, at the end of the Literations, take  j  to be the outcome response that was most 
frequently assigned to observation n when it was “out-of-bag”. This is then the RF 
predicted classification for that observation. In this way, each observation in the original 
sample is classified as corresponding to a particular outcome response depending on the 
modal classification accorded to it by the L trees. The “out-of-bag” misclassification 
estimate is then the proportion of times that  j  is not equal to the actual outcome response 
of observation n given by the data averaged over all observations. Breiman (2001) shows 
that this misclassification estimate is unbiased. 
                                                 




Finally, RF obtains a measure of variable importance for each identity marker by 
randomly permuting the values of each particular identity marker for the “out-of-bag” 
observations and then classifying these scrambled observations using the “in-bag” trees. RF 
defines the importance score for each identity marker as the average difference between the 
number of votes for the correct (i.e., observed) outcome response in the permuted “out-of-
bag” data from the number of votes for the correct outcome response in the untouched “out 
of bag” data across the L trees. The idea is simple and compelling. If it is possible to 
substitute incorrect values for an identity marker and still obtain accurate predictions for 
outcome response classifications, then that identity marker cannot have been very important 
for classifying outcome responses in the first place.  
 
4.  Data 
 
We use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) in our empirical study of the 
correspondence in the United States between identity, redistribution preferences, and related 
variables. A variety of topics are covered in the survey, such as political activism, child-
rearing, religious beliefs, and women's rights. Demographic variables such as the 
respondent's age, sex, income bracket, socioeconomic status, and education level are also 
collected. The samples are intended to be nationally representative of adults over 18, with 
weighting of certain groups. 
Several identity variables in the GSS are used in each tree regression to constitute the 
vectorx. Given the data constraints, we have chosen the most appropriate proxies available 




2. The identity variables are the respondent's age in years (AGE), her gender (SEX), her self-
reported race
9 (RACE); the region of the US in which she was living at 16 (REGION16), 
whether the respondent was born in the US (BORN), whether the respondent's parents were 
born in the US (PARBORN), the respondent's mother's highest educational degree as a 
proxy of socioeconomic background (MADEG), what religion in which the respondent was 
raised (RELIG16), and the respondent's description of his religious upbringing as 
fundamentalist, moderate or liberal
10 (FUND16). A trend variable (YEAR) is also included.  
Our aim is to understand the correspondence between identity markers and views on 
redistribution patterns, given complex heterogeneity in both sets of variables. We use the 
above identity markers to classify responses to questions asking about such views. To 
examine the consistency of these classifications with theory, we compare these classifications 
with those obtained for a set of other dependent variables. In the next section we define the 
other dependent variables and provide motivation for their use. A summary of all dependent 
variables used is provided in Table 3. The reader is also referred to the Appendix for further 
detail about the questions. 
 
 
                                                 
9 This question asks the respondent to identify himself as white, black, or other. While we would have preferred 
a question with more ethnic detail, this was the best question that the GSS offered over many waves. 
 
10 One identity variable described in the Data Appendix is not objective: FUND16. This question asks the 
respondent to classify one's upbringing as fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal. We include this variable because 
of an a priori hypothesis that religious background may impact one's view of income redistribution. The 
variable RELIG16, that classifies the denomination of religious upbringing, does not distinguish between, say, 
different ideologies within Protestantism. We use FUND16 as an attempt to allow for such distinction. We ran 
the trees for EQWLTH, the main question of interest on income redistribution preferences, with and without 
FUND16 as an explanatory variable. In fact, we find that neither RELIG16 nor FUND16 appears in a robust 





5.  Results 
 
The classification trees and random forests were constructed using pooled data for 
all years between 1978 and 2000 in which the relevant dependent variable was asked. Key 
results
11 discussed in this section are summarized in Tables 4-15.   
In general, the CART
TM and RF results are consistent. In particular, the variables that 
RF identifies as the most important classifiers generally reflect the splitting variables chosen 
by CART
TM. The difference in misclassification error rates between RF and CART
TM are 
marginal at around 5% (with the former being the lower of the two as expected). However, 
the RF error rates are relatively high at above 60%. This is not entirely surprising since 
misclassification rates tend to increase with greater number of categories for the outcome 
response variable. Further, this error rate should be compared to an error rate between 
predicted response and actual response in a multinomial regression context, which one 
would expect to be in the same sort of range. Nonetheless, given that the aim of the 
classification exercise is the identification of homogenous groupings, the residual 
heterogeneity within such groupings strongly suggests that we need to be careful in avoiding 
strict, monolithic interpretations of our results. 
 
5.1 Regarding Redistribution Preferences 
 
We turn first to our results for redistribution preferences. We consider classifications 
of responses to two measures of redistribution preferences
12 (EQWLTH and NATFARE).  
                                                 
11 Some results described are not summarized in tables in order to keep the number of tables manageable.  All 





The first asks about views on governmental redistribution to reduce income differences 
(EQWLTH). The redistribution question is asked in each wave of the GSS between 1978 
and 2000. The second asks about whether the level of welfare spending is too high or too 
low (NATFARE). For consistent comparison, the sample considered is also each survey 
wave between 1978 and 2000. 
The CART
TM tree and RF results for EQWLTH have the following robust features 
(see Tables 4 and 5).  The RACE variable is the most important splitting variable, and it 
splits into whites and non-whites
13. AGE, SEX, and MADEG are also important splitting 
variables within whites only. AGE splits the sample into young-to-middle aged adults and 
older adults. This split corresponds to lifecycle effects on income and wealth. Older adults, 
having accumulated wealth and higher incomes, may be expected to be less in favor of 
income redistribution than younger adults. The split by MADEG separates respondents with 
mothers who did not complete high school (MADEG=0) from the rest of the population. 
Men and women are also classified distinctly. 
Overall, non-whites and young whites with low maternal education (MADEG=0) are 
classified as having strong preferences for redistribution (EQWLTH=1). All other white 
men and older white women not from low socioeconomic backgrounds are classified as 
having preferences against redistribution (EQWLTH=6 or 7). Older white women from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds and younger white women from higher socioeconomic 
backgrounds are classified as having neutral preferences (EQWLTH=3 or 4). Non-whites 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 These questions are used in related empirical studies. Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) use both EQWLTH and 
NATFARE. Luttmer (2001) employs NATFARE in his work. 
 
13 Because the non-black, non-white group consists of a small number of observations and are such a 





have a strong preference for governmental redistribution, while white men who are not 
young or who do not have a low-status socioeconomic background have a strong preference 
against governmental redistribution. White women are classified across a range of views 
depending on age and socioeconomic background. 
The robust groupings for NATFARE correspond primarily to race, with a split 
between blacks and others. Although this variable is the same as that for EQWLTH, there 
are more subtle groupings for EQWLTH that are not present for NATFARE. Therefore, 
though responses to the variables may be related, we conclude that responses to the 
EQWLTH question do not simply reflect views on welfare
14. 
Since both of these redistribution preference measures, EQWLTH and NATFARE, 
include explicit reference to a governmental role in redistribution, there are two possible 
interpretations for the variation in responses across identity groups. First, this variation 
could be attributed to differences in individuals' general confidence in government. Second, 
this variation could be due to individual differences in tolerance for inequality. 
To investigate the possibility that the variation in responses to our redistribution 
preference measures, EQWLTH and NATFARE, across identity groups, could be due to 
variation in the general confidence in government, we consider the classification of 
responses to two questions that ask about the respondent's confidence in federal 
governmental institutions (CONFED and CONLEGIS) and compare them with those 
obtained for EQWLTH and NATFARE. 
We find that the nature of the identity groups responsible for variations in responses 
to CONFED and CONLEGIS are not the same as those for EQWLTH or NATFARE (see 
Tables 6 and 7).  Moreover, the classifying variables for CONFED and CONLEGIS are not 
                                                 




the same across the CART
TM and RF analyses. With this lack of robustness, the classifying 
variables do not appear to provide an informative prediction of opinions. Overall, there 
appears to be a relationship between confidence in government and views on welfare 
spending via classification by race, but the evidence is suggestive at best. We have to look 
elsewhere to understand the identity groupings that delineate redistribution preferences. 
We next ask whether variation in redistribution preference can be attributed to 
differences in tolerance for inequality using two questions that ask the respondent's view on 
the fairness of income differences (INCGAP and WHYPOOR4). Recall that the Benabou 
and Ok framework predicts matching identity groups for redistribution preferences and 
views on inequality. Therefore, we would expect the trees for EQWLTH and NATFARE to 
be similar to those of INCGAP and WHYPOOR4. However, we do not find evidence to 
suggest that this is the case (see Tables 8 and 9). The robust finding is that the splits are 
different from EQWLTH and NATFARE.  For one dependent variable, INCGAP, there is 
a split by years. The split of 1996 from other two years may be reflective of welfare reform 
that was legislated that year. The other variable, WHYPOOR, is split by region in a way that 
is not readily interpretable.  Crucially, the splits are not the same as each other, nor the same 
as EQWLTH or NATFARE.  
In sum, there is some systematic heterogeneity in Americans’ concerns about 
inequality and beliefs regarding the ability to escape poverty. But the key features of this 







5.2 Comparison with Mobility Beliefs 
 
An implication of Piketty's model and the hypothesis of endogenous interactions is 
that heterogeneity in mobility beliefs drives heterogeneity in redistribution preferences. That 
is, Piketty's theory can imply corresponding identity groupings for the redistribution 
preference dependent variables and those that describe mobility beliefs, particularly views on 
hard work versus luck. Therefore, we examine whether identity classifications for 
redistribution preferences match those for mobility belief variables. The results suggest that 
this is not the case. 
We first consider the classification of responses to two questions that ask only about 
the role of hard work in getting ahead (OPHRDWK and LFEHRDWK) and compare them 
to those for EQWLTH and NATFARE. The variables OPHRDWRK and LFEHRDWK 
produce no splits in the classification trees. The RF results suggest some importance of age, 
sex, and the region in which one was raised (see Table 10). Next, we consider the 
classification of responses to a question that asks about the relative importance of hard work 
for ‘getting ahead’ (GETAHEAD). The results for GETAHEAD have the same type of 
problem as CONFED and CONLEGIS described above. That is, the CART
TM and RF 
results for GETAHEAD do not reveal robust splitting variables. 
At this point, one might question the generality of the questions on hard work as 
proxies for mobility beliefs. Perhaps a respondent's mobility beliefs are influenced by 
evaluation of her past or future mobility. In that case, identity classifications for past 
mobility should inform identity groupings for redistribution preferences. We therefore 




consider the classification of responses to two questions that provide an evaluation of the 
respondent's actual mobility, and compare these to those obtained for EQWLTH and 
NATFARE. This approach is based on a presumption that actual mobility informs mobility 
beliefs.  
One variable we construct is the absolute value of the difference between the 
respondent's education level and that of his or her father (PADEG_ABS_DIFF). The 
second is a variable that measures the respondent's perceived standard of living now relative 
to his parents at the same age
15 (PARSOL). A third question provides an evaluation of 
expected dynastic mobility, and asks the respondent to compare his standard of living to that 
expected for his children at a similar age (KIDSSOL). 
When asked to compare one's standard of living to one’s parents’ at the same age 
(PARSOL) the robust classifications are by AGE and MADEG (see Tables 11 and 12). 
There is a split at middle age, similar to EQWLTH, but also at retirement age. The MADEG 
split is qualitatively the same as for EQWLTH. However, the classifications by MADEG do 
not run in the direction one would expect to explain the classification by MADEG for 
EQWLTH. That is, those from low-education backgrounds are more likely to consider 
themselves better off than their parents, but are also classified as more strongly in favor of 
income redistribution. There is no split by race. 
The variable that measures comparison with one’s children’s standard of living 
(KIDSSOL) is classified differently from PARSOL and EQWLTH. There is a split by 
                                                 
15 We do not include results for PADEG_DIFF which is the pure difference between the respondent's degree 
level and his father's. The results are similar to those for PADEG_ABS_DIFF. However, Fields and Ok (1999) 
provides an axiomatic justification for PADEG_ABS_DIFF that does not hold for PADEG_DIFF. Also, 
PADEG_DIFF will inevitably result in an un-interpretable distribution of responses since the education 
variables are by construction censored above and below. We also do not employ a question that asks about the 
respondent's job status relative to his or her father's. This question seems difficult to interpret in that 




RACE into whites and non-whites, but only for some regions, which is hard to interpret.  
More importantly, the classifications by race do not run in the direction one would expect, 
from Piketty’s framework, to explain the classification by RACE for EQWLTH.   
Using the dependent variable measuring the difference between respondent’s 
education and his father’s (PADEG_ABS_DIFF), we find that AGE and MADEG are 
important splitting variables. Again, RACE is conspicuous in its absence.  
In contrast to what one would expect from theory, we do not find a concurring set 
of identity groupings for mobility beliefs and redistribution preferences. Rather, whatever 
forces drive heterogeneity in mobility beliefs do not appear to be the same as those at work 
for redistribution preferences. 
 
5.3  Comparison with Socioeconomic Status 
 
As noted above, we would expect from information-based theories on the 
determination of redistribution preferences that heterogeneity of identity groupings 
uncovered for redistribution preferences be less complex than those for variables measuring 
socioeconomic status. To investigate this implication of the theory, we first consider 
classification of responses to a measure of the respondent's education level (DEGREE) and 
compare it with those obtained for redistribution preferences. The results indicate that the 
classification tree for DEGREE is highly complex, with 39 terminal nodes. The tree does 
not produce interpretable structure at that level of complexity. The important classification 
variables in this tree are MADEG and, secondarily, AGE. These variables are also the most 




results (see Table 13). There is therefore more complexity present but it does not include 
RACE as an important classifying variable. That is, the salient classifiers of EQWLTH and 
NATFARE are not nested in the classifications for DEGREE. 
We next compare the classification of responses for EQWLTH and NATFARE to a 
measure of the respondent’s real family income (REALINC). We find that the regression 
tree for REALINC is not more complex than the analogous tree for EQWLTH (see Table 
14). Similar splits are present, though here RACE is not the most important variable. Rather, 
MADEG and AGE are. All else equal, being younger, coming from a low-status 
socioeconomic background, or being black is associated with a lower predicted household 
income. There is also a split by AGE around retirement that is not present in the EQWLTH 
tree described above
16. 
Given this similarity in classifying variables, a valid question is whether responses to 
EQWLTH, or preferences for income redistribution, are determined entirely by the 
respondent’s income. If the classification tree for EQWLTH were to be run using the same 
set of identity markers plus REALINC, how does the classification tree change? We report 
the classification tree and random forest results for this exercise in Table 15. In a 
classification tree for EQWLTH that includes REALINC as a classifying variable, RACE 
remains an important classifier of redistribution preferences, independent of REALINC. In 
fact, the RF results show that RACE is as important as REALINC. Comparing this tree to 
that without REALINC, it appears that REALINC partly takes the place of MADEG and 
                                                 
16 Results obtained using real respondent’s income, REALRINC, was also analyzed. The results do not tell us 
more than REALINC except that sex is a major component in REALRINC. This is expected since the income 
variable corresponds to a respondent’s income rather than a household’s. Also, Jewish men are classified as 




AGE as classifying variables. This displacement is not surprising in light of the REALINC 
tree results.  
These results suggest that differences in respondent’s income cannot fully explain 
differences in redistribution preferences. Crucially, variations in responses attributed to 
differences in race remain even when respondent’s income is controlled for.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
We provide a new set of stylized facts regarding salient heterogeneity patterns for 
preferences regarding government provision of income redistribution and related variables. 
We find that general views on redistribution are heterogeneous according to race as well as 
income determinants including socioeconomic background, age, and gender. Specific views 
on welfare are heterogeneous primarily according to race.  
We cannot explain these patterns by variation in overall confidence in government, 
nor by differences across identity groups in their abstract tolerance for inequality. These 
results raise theoretical challenges. How can it be that we have no systematic correspondence 
between inequality tolerance or confidence in government and variation in preference for 
government-administered income redistribution? Why is race an important classifying 
variable for views on income redistribution independent of income? 
Existing information-based theoretical models do not appear to completely explain 
our empirical results. The empirical patterns of systematic heterogeneity for mobility beliefs 
and abstract inequality tolerance are not consistent with patterns predicted by theory. We 




preference determination, they do not tell the whole story. This is a potentially important 
area for future research. 
Our results also imply that the salient groupings relevant for preference-based 
theories of redistribution preferences go beyond ethnicity, except perhaps when talking 
about welfare policy specifically. In general, we find these groupings are more complex, also 
reflecting differences based on lifecycle considerations and class background. Perhaps 
surprisingly, religious background, both in terms of denomination and ideology, does not 
play a role in describing systematic heterogeneity in redistribution preference or household 
income. Religious background and its influence on individual income differences, as well as 
cross-country growth differences, have been the subject of many studies
17. 
In our view, the results of this paper constitute a puzzle to be resolved in future 
research. We see at least two avenues of theoretical ideas that are potentially useful toward 
such resolution. One is related to the ideas of Loury (1998). Redistribution preference 
classifications may reflect expected income classifications, as in Benabou and Ok (2001). 
Expected income groupings may differ from those of current income for the following 
reason. Expected income may be determined using information about others in one's 
identity group. Such information may be costly to gather. Thus, these identity groups may be 
determined using a few historically important variables such as race, class background, age, 
and gender. In addition, the determination of expected income may vary little with individual 
mobility beliefs. Individuals may reason that the combination of individual effort and 
institutional constraints that hold for others like one’s self will, in expectation, hold for one’s 
self. Expected income may largely be determined by information regarding institutional 
                                                 
17 For examples of work on religion and its effect on income, see Sander (1992) and Tomes (1984). For an 
example of work on religion and its effect on growth, see Barro and McCleary (2003) and Durlauf, Kourtellos, 




constraints that vary across identity groups, rather than views on the marginal effect of effort 
in determining outcomes that do not vary in the same way. 
Redistribution preferences may also be determined based not only on current income 
but also on the ability to smooth consumption.  There exists empirical evidence that blacks 
face more volatile income, have less wealth, and are more credit-constrained than whites. 
These differences may also provide an explanation for race’s independent salience that is 
grounded in rational expectations. 
A second idea is related to Roemer's (1999) analysis of the implications of people 
voting on a range of issues, only some of which are directly identity-relevant. Some issues are 
directly relevant to race, gender, or class. Examples are affirmative action and civil rights 
policies. Other issues are less directly relevant, such as those regarding income redistribution 
or public education funding. Because people vote on a range of issues at once, such as when 
voting for a candidate, views on policies that are not directly related to identity may be highly 
correlated with identity
18. In this way, redistribution preferences may vary significantly across 
identity groups, even if theoretically related variables do not vary similarly. 
                                                 
18 This hypothesis is also discussed in Lee and Roemer (2004) and empirical tests are offered. We find their 
empirical study problematic for reasons we have discussed in this paper, and remain open on the question of 
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A1. Dependent variables 
 
A1.1 Preference for public redistribution 
 
1.  EQWLTH (1978-2000): Some people think that the government in Washington ought to 
reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy 
families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not 
concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with 
a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income 
differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern 
itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? 
2.  NATFARE (1978-2000): We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can 
be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like 
you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the 
right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare? (1 = 
Too little, 2 = About right, 3 = Too much) 
 
A1.2 Tolerance for inequality 
 
1.  INCGAP (1987, 1996, 2000): Do you agree or disagree. Differences in income in America are 
too large. (1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
Somewhat disagree, 5 = Strongly disagree) 
2.  WHYPOOR4
19 (1990): Now I will a list of reasons some people give to explain why there are 
poor people in this country. Please tell me whether you feel each of these is very important, somewhat 
important, or not important in explaining why there are poor people in this country. Lack of effort 
by the poor themselves (1 = Very important, 2 = Somewhat important, 3 = Not 
important) 
                                                 
19 The question is interpreted in this case as giving insight into a person's view of the fairness of inequality. It 
could also be interpreted as a question about mobility beliefs, i.e. whether it is possible for the poor to increase 




A1.3 Mobility beliefs 
 
1.  GETAHEAD (1980-2000): Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; 
others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is 
most important? (1 = Hard work most important, 2 = Hard work, luck equally 
important, 3 = Luck most important) 
2.  OPHRDWK (1987): Please show for each of these how important you think it is for getting 
ahead in life . . .Hard work -- how important is that for getting ahead in life? (1 = Essential, 2 
= Very important, 3 = Fairly important, 4 = Not very important, 5 = Not important 
at all) 
3.  LFEHRDWK (1993): I'm going to read some statements that give reasons why a person's life 
turns out well or poorly. As I read each one, tell me whether you think it is very important, 
important, somewhat important, or not at all important for how somebody's life turns out? Some 
people use their will power and work harder than others. (1 = Very important, 2 = Important, 




1.  PADEG_ABS_DIFF (1978-2000): Absolute difference between DEGREE and 
PADEG. DEGREE is respondent's highest educational degree and PADEG is 
respondent's father's highest educational degree. See DEGREE below that gives 
categories for both questions. 
2.  PARSOL (1994-2000): Compared to your parents when they were the age you are now, do you 
think your own standard of living now is much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat 
worse, or much worse than theirs was? (1= Much better, 2 = Somewhat better, 3 = About 
the same, 4 = Somewhat worse, 5 = Much worse) 
3.  KIDSSOL (1994-2000): When your children are at the age you are now, do you think their 
standard of living will be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much 
worse than yours is now? (1= Much better, 2 = Somewhat better, 3 = About the same, 4 





A1.5 Current income 
 
1.  REALINC (1978-1996): Family income on 1972-1996 surveys in constant dollars 
(base = 1986) 
2.  REALRINC (1978-1996): Respondent’s income on 1972-1996 surveys in constant 
dollars (base = 1986) 
3.  DEGREE (1978-2000): Respondent’s degree (0 = Less than high school, 1 = High 
school, 2 = Associate/junior college, 3 = Bachelor's, 4 = Graduate) 
 
A1.6 Confidence in government 
  
1.  CONFED (1978-2000): I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the 
people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, 
only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Executive branch of the federal 
government (1 = A great deal, 2 = Only some, 3 = Hardly any) 
2.  CONLEGIS (1978-2000): I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the 
people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, 
only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Congress (1 = A great deal, 2 = 
Only some, 3 = Hardly any) 
 
A2. Identity markers 
 
Here identity variables are detailed where their description in the text is incomplete. Those 
variables are SEX, RACE, REGION16, BORN, PARBORN, MADEG, RELIG16, and 
FUND16. 
 
1.  SEX (1 = Male, 2 = Female) 
2.  RACE: What race would you consider yourself? (Recorded verbatim and coded) (1 = 
White, 2 = Black, 3 = Other) 
3.  REGION16: In what state or foreign country were you living when you were 16 years old? 




4 = West North Central, 5 = South Atlantic, 6 = East South Central, 7 = West 
South Central, 8 = Mountain, 9 = Pacific, 0 = Foreign) 
New England = Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, Massachusetts 
Middle Atlantic = New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
    East North Central = Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan 
West North Central = Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Missouri, Kansas 
South Atlantic = Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, District of Columbia 
East South Central = Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi 
West South Central = Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas 
Mountain = Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, 
New Mexico 
Pacific = Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii 
 
4.  BORN: Were you born in this country? (1= Yes, 2 = No; don't know responses were 
treated as missing values) 
5.  PARBORN: Were both of your parents born in this country? (1 = Both born in the US, 2 
= One born in the US, 3 = Neither born in the US; don't know responses were 
treated as missing values) 
6.  MADEG: Respondent's mother's education (Recoded by GSS from a set of 
questions regarding years of schooling and degrees attained) (0 = Less than high 
school, 1 = high school, 2 = Associate/junior college, 3 = Bachelor's, 4 = Graduate; 
don't know or NA responses treated as missing values) 
7.  RELIG16: In what religion were you raised? (1 = Protestant, 2 = Catholic, 3 = Jewish, 4 
= None, 5 = Other) 
8.  FUND16: Fundamentalism/Liberalism of religion respondent raised in. (1 = 
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Preference
Piketty Benabou & 
Ok
Table 1: Summary of Theoretical PredictionsTable 2
Summary of Identity Variables
Identity Marker Years Mean Standard Deviation
SEX 1978-2000 1.56 0.50
RACE 1978-2000 1.16 0.44
REGION16 1978-2000 4.37 2.46
BORN 1978-2000 1.06 0.24
PARBORN 1978-2000 1.24 0.60
MADEG 1978-2000 0.81 0.94
RELIG16 1978-2000 1.47 0.73
FUND16 1978-2000 1.90 0.74
AGE 1978-2000 44.78 16.98
Please use this table in conjunction with the Appendix in the paper
which includes a complete description of each question.Table 3
Summary of Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable Years Mean Standard Deviation
EQWLTH 1978-2000 3.76 1.95
NATFARE 1978-2000 2.32 0.77
INCGAP 1987, 1996,2000 2.34 1.13
WHYPOOR4 1990 1.62 0.63
GETAHEAD 1980-2000 1.45 0.70
OPHRDWRK 1987 1.75 0.69
LFEHRDWK 1993 1.49 0.64
PADEG_ABS_DIF 1978-2000 0.94 1.03
PARSOL 1994-2000 2.21 1.11
KIDSSOL 1994-2000 2.79 1.55
REALINC 1978-1996 31075.67 26563.77
REALRINC 1978-1996 20299.39 18686.24
DEGREE 1978-2000 1.43 1.17
CONFED 1978-2000 2.16 0.67
CONLEGIS 1978-2000 2.17 0.62
Please use this table in conjunction with the Appendix in the paper
which includes a complete description of each question.6,7* 3 7 6 4 7 1 1 Predicted Classification
2 2 1 1 2 1 All All Sex
>36 <37 >25 <26 >43 >43 <44 All Age
1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 0 0 0 All Madeg
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,3 Race
A7 A7 A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 Classification Variable
#Each column corresponds to an identity grouping uncovered by CARTTM.
* There are two terminal nodes split by years: 84,88,89,90,91,96,00; and 78,80,83.86,87,93,94,98
Table 4#: EQWLTH Classification TreeTable 5: EQWLTH Random Forests
Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
RACE 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 82.93  ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
SEX 69.23  ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
MADEG 48.78  |||||||||||||||||||| 
FUND16 22.19  ||||||||| 
REGION16 12.03  |||| 
PARBORN 8.93  ||| 
RELIG16 6.29  || 
BORN 2.59   
YEAR 1.25   
 
 Table 6#: CONFED Classification Tree
3 1 3 1 2 Predicted Classification
2 1, 3 All All All Race
All All 1, 2 3 All Parborn
1984, 86, 87, 
88, 89, 90, 91
1984, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 91
1980, 1993, 94, 
96, 98 2000
1980, 1993, 94, 96, 
98 2000
1978, 1983 Year
A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 Classification Variable
#Each column corresponds to an identity grouping uncovered by CARTTM.Table 7: CONFED Random Forests
Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
REGION16 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 84.05  ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
SEX 71.84  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
FUND16 39.88  |||||||||||||||| 
PARBORN 35.40  |||||||||||||| 
BORN 28.82  ||||||||||| 
MADEG 27.43  ||||||||||| 
RELIG16 25.56  |||||||||| 
RACE 21.93  |||||||| 
YEAR 14.37  ||||| 
 















#Each column corresponds to an identity grouping uncovered by CARTTM.Table 9: INCGAP, WHYPOOR Random Forests
Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
YEAR 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
SEX 68.23  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 31.35  |||||||||||| 
REGION16 26.91  ||||||||||| 
RACE 13.34  ||||| 
MADEG 10.21  ||| 
RELIG16 9.09  ||| 
FUND16 7.62  || 
PARBORN 3.31   




Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
REGION16 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
RACE 46.31  ||||||||||||||||||| 
RELIG16 43.15  |||||||||||||||||| 
MADEG 42.73  ||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 40.37  |||||||||||||||| 
PARBORN 27.39  ||||||||||| 
FUND16 19.19  ||||||| 
SEX 12.89  ||||| 
BORN 1.81   
YEAR 0.00   
 Table 10: OPHRDWRK, LFEHRDWK Random Forests*
* There are no significant splits in the data detected by CART TM for either dependent variable
Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
REGION16 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
SEX 97.02  ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 86.18  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
RELIG16 49.15  |||||||||||||||||||| 
RACE 48.05  |||||||||||||||||||| 
MADEG 46.93  ||||||||||||||||||| 
FUND16 31.44  ||||||||||||| 
PARBORN 11.66  |||| 
BORN 4.84  | 




Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
REGION16 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 56.57  ||||||||||||||||||||||| 
SEX 47.63  ||||||||||||||||||| 
MADEG 44.26  |||||||||||||||||| 
FUND16 31.74  ||||||||||||| 
RELIG16 27.97  ||||||||||| 
RACE 18.94  ||||||| 
PARBORN 17.99  ||||||| 
BORN 7.31  || 
YEAR 0.00   






4, 5* 4 2 1 5 Predicted 
Classification
0, 1, 7-9 2-6 All All All Region16
1-4 1-4 1-4 0 0 Madeg
>26 and <62 >26 and <62 <27 >47 and <62 <48 Age
A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 Classification 
Variable
#Each column corresponds to an identity grouping uncovered by CARTTM.Table 12: PARSOL Random Forests
Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
AGE 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
MADEG 79.41  ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
REGION16 16.66  |||||| 
YEAR 8.98  ||| 
FUND16 8.60  ||| 
SEX 8.16  ||| 
RELIG16 6.10  || 
PARBORN 3.55  | 
BORN 2.66   
RACE 2.61   
 
 Table 13: DEGREE Random Forests
Random Forests Variable Importance (Standard) 
Variable  Score    
MADEG 100.00  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
AGE 43.94  |||||||||||||||||| 
REGION16 18.30  ||||||| 
FUND16 10.97  |||| 
RELIG16 7.99  || 
PARBORN 5.13  | 
SEX 4.65  | 
RACE 1.79   
BORN 1.76   
YEAR 1.08   
 
 Table 14#: REALINC Regression Tree
$28K $45K $38K $28K $27K $17K $33K $23K $21K Predicted 
REALINC
All 1,3 1,3 2 All All 1 2,3  All Race
>65 >36, <66 >30, <37 >30, <66 <31 >64 >32, <65 >32, <65 <33 Age
1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 0 0 0 0 Madeg
A9 A8 A7 A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 Classification 
Variable
#Each column corresponds to an identity grouping uncovered by CARTTM.Table 15#: EQWLTH Classification Tree (with REALINC as classification variable)
6, 7** 6, 7* 7 1 3 6 1 1 Predicted 
Classification
All All All All 2 1 All All Sex
All All All All 1-4 1-4 0 All Madeg
All All >38 >38 <39 <39 <39 All Age




<14171 <34003 <34003 <34003 All Realinc
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,3 Race
A8 A7 A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 Classification 
Variable
#Each column corresponds to an identity grouping uncovered by CARTTM.
* There are two terminal nodes split by years: 1980, 84, 89, 90, 91, 96.
**There are two terminal nodes split by age: less than 49 and over 48.Table 16: Summary of Results
No heterogeneity or 
different variables
Heterogeneity No Heterogeneity (?) Mobility Beliefs
Heterogeneity (some 
similar variables)
At least as much het. 
as for Redist. Pref.
At least as much het. 





No Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Tolerance for 
Inequality
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Redistribution 
Preference
Results Piketty Benabou & Ok 
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